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VIII. 
Foreword. 
It may be w~ll,by way of introduction,to state the plan which 
has- been adhered to in the development of this essay as well as the outline 
of the subject-matter itself. The plan has been,in the first place,to seek 
to state the author 1 s-position on each topic as clearly and as fully as the 
scope of this paper would permit;and,secondly,to buttress each important 
statement with adequate and fair quotations;and,then,in the third place,to 
offer such criticisms as I considered justified by the discussion. But I do 
not wish to convey the impression that my attitude is wholly negative and 
critical,for I have found much which to my thought is both excellent in 
expression and valid in reason. 
The outline of the subject-matter itself follows,in the main, 
the natural groupings of the topics treated in Professor Holt's recent book 
. 
"The Concept Of Consciousness",and may be stated in the following order. 
First,a discussion of Logic as the science of being rather than the science 
of valid thinking; second, a consideration as to what constitutes the essence 
or real,.nature of things; thirdl a presentation of the Neo-Reaiistic concept, 
of consciousness;and,finallz, the problem of error and its relation to this 
new conception of mind. 
ff 
1.' 
I• As a preliminary discussion Professor Holt devotes two or three chapters 
to the study of modern logic,its discoveries and implications,and it is my 
purpose in this the first sect ion of my essay to state what these· discoveries 
are,paying special attention,however,to the inferences which Professor Holt 
draws from them. 
The root-thought of this whole discussion is that logic deals 
primarily,not with the laws of thought as such,but rather with the laws of 
being,though it must be understood that for modern logic the laws of being 
are the same as those which have hitherto been denominated laws of thought. 
' . 
In other words,it is by this extension of the thought-sphere to include all 
being,though not,however,in any idealistic fashion,that the Nee-Realistic 
systems become so puzzling,and,in a sense,contradictory. "In. order to under-
staqd the consequences for philosophy of modern investigations in logic,we 
must take a brief and tentative survey of what symbolic logic is and of what 
it has learned. The first new truth depends upon the discovery that logic 
and mathematics are one,and that logic is not the.science of correct thinking 
merely, but that it is a science of what is •••••••••••••••. Mathematics has 
always dealt with something that clearly is more than the mathematician's 
rr.ere thought,with something,that is, which is either so or is not,and is 
inexorably the one or the other. In questions of logic moreover,thoueht,in 
order to be 1 correct 1 had to proceed in certain ways,had to conform to laws, 
I" 
and so there was at least the presumption that logic too was a science of 
something'correct';since thought might be correct or incorrect."* 
Having thus extended the scope of logic so as to include 
mathematics and eeometry,logic becomes,of course,the science of all being 
and consequently it becomes a matter of utmost importance to understand this 
the science of all the sciences in its inmost nature,and therefore we must. 
ask what laws it follows as well as for the subject-matter which is involved 
in its operations. 
* Concept Of Consciousness,pp.3-4. 
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Mr. Holt dismisses the first of these considerations· with a 'brief quotation 
from Mr.Bertrand Russell,but since this aspect of the question is for my 
thought of very great importance,and since Mr.Russell is used as an absolute 
authority in this regard,I have decided to present Mr.Russell's view of the 
matter. It is,in brief,as follows:- There exist in our mental nature certain 
fundamental Or 1 a prj ori 1 laWS Which determine the Ylay in Which OUr ex:per ience 
must come to us. These are the famous'categories' of Kant,only it must be 
seen that they are not merely laws of thought,they are the laws of all being. 
Writing on this last point he says: "Apart fran< the special doctrines 
advocated by Kant,it is very common among philosophers to regard what is 
'a priori' as in some sense mental,as concerned rather with the way we must 
think than with any fact of the outer world. We noted in the preceding 
·chapter the three principles commonly called 'laws of thought'. The view 
which led to their being so named is a natural one but there are strong 
reasons for thinking that it is erroneous. Let us. take as an illustration 
the law of contradiction. This is commonly stated in the form 'Nothing can 
both be and not be 1 ,which is intended to express the fact that nothing can 
at once have and not have a given quality. Thus,for example,if a tree is a 
beach,it cannot also be not a beach;if my table is rectangular,it cannot 
also be not rectangular,and so on. Now what makes it natural to call this 
principle a law of thought is that it is by thought rather than by outward 
observation ~hat we persuade ourselves of its necessary truth. When we have 
seen ,that a tree is a beech;we do not need to look again in order to ascer-
( 
\ 
tain whther it is also not a beech;thought alone makes us know that this is 
impossible. But the conclusion that the law of contradiction is a law of 
thought is nevertheless erroneous. What we believe,when we believe the law 
of contradiction,is not that the mind is so made that it must.believe the 
law of contradiction. This belief is, a subsequent result of psychological 
reflection,which presupposes the belief in the law of contradiction. The 
belief in the law of contradiction is a belief .about things,not only about 
thoughts. It is not,e.g. the belief that if we think a certain tree is a 
3. 
beech, we cannot at the same time think that it is not a b.ee.ch .......... 
• • • • . • • Thus the law of contradiction is about. things,and not merely about 
thoughts;and although belief in the law of contradiction is a thought the 
law of contradiction itself is not a thought·but a fact concerning the 
things in the world."* Having learned what Mr.Russell's position is we may 
leave the matter without criticism for the present and turn our thought to 
the second point mentioned - the subject-matter of modern logic as concei-
ved by Professor Holt. He quotes from professor Huntington as follows:-"The 
first step in such a discussion is to decide on the fundamental concepts 
or undefined symbols,concerning which the statement of the algebra is to 
be made.· ••.•...••••••••• Having chosen the fundamental concepts, the next 
step is to decide on the fundamental propositions or postulates,which are 
to stand as the basis of the algebra."** Cownenting on this statement 
Professor Holt says: -"Thus the fundamental entities are of two kinds, the 
elements or terms ('undefined symbols') which if not exhibited have at 
least to be named;and the propositions and postulates ('hypotheses') from 
which the entire algebra follows by logical deduction. This distintion is 
of the highest importance,because the terms or elements play,if one may 
speak figuratively,a passive part in the system;while the propositions, 
one is bound,in spite of the metaphor,to feel,are the active factors. 
This opposition of active and passive is perhaps not generally recognized 
and may at first seem highly fanciful. Nevertheless the strictest logicians 
.. 
hav.~ not been able to avoid language that implies just this opposition. 
Theipostulates, it is , that yield by deduct ion, the subsequent port ions of 
the system."*** Professor.Holt's next step is to show that propositions 
are really terms in relation,"that accuracy of form would require each 
relation to be expressed in a separat~ proposition", (p.7.) and the next 
and final step is to get some sort of change and motion into the terms 
or entities in relation (propositions) and this is done by saying that 
"new simple terms can be deduced from acertain kind of proposition,namely, 
* The Problems of Philosophy,pp.l35-138. 
** E.V. Huntington, Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of 
Logic,Trans.of the American Math.Soc.l904,Vol.V.,p.288. 
*** The Concept of Consciousness,p.6. 
~I! -
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the kind that postulates a recurrence. A simple illustration is -'A 
repeats itself.' Now the second A,being an A, must also repeat itself; 
and so on without end. The variety of such recurrent propositions is 
seemingly as endless as the series of terms that each generates. Such 
processes can also generate propositions that are new,as well as terms. 11 
After having quoted from Professor Royce's "Supplementary Essay" in the 
first volume of the "The World And The Individual" in order to support 
his assertion as to the fact of recurrent or 'self-representative' pro-
cesses he says further:-"That peculiar agency,once again, which seems 
inherent in recurrent and other deductive processes is a feature that 
is' specially worth noting. The given terms and propositions generate what 
we know as the_ system of valid deductions and consequences. It seems to 
be this relatively independent activity of the system itself that the 
mathematician and the logician follows,as he would trace the course of 
a river,when he 1deduces 1by 'logical necessity' hitherto hidden features 
of the system that he is studying. For at bottom'logical necessity' is 
the term of the conforming thinker for that whi~h logically is."* 
Before returning upon these points for detailed 
criticisms, it 1nay be well to summarize in one connected statement the 
basic logical concept ion upon which Neo-Real ism builds. It may be foriJ.lU-
lated as follows:.;;. "The ~±~-~~ ex;eerience forms ~-~~~~~which_!s b~~~~ 
~uon a few_~!~le~undefina?le terms,some~f_wh!~~-~~~-reE~titive in their 
I' 
nature,and which.!~~~~~-~-!~~~~ent order unf~!~~~-£~mb!ne int~-~~!= 
folds of great~£_an£._g!~~!~~-..2.2~~~~!!!Y. af!d :eo~~!.-!~~-£2!.!£2e!~~~-!~~!.~­
cat ion is t~~!--~~~11-.~~!!.-f!!~~El if!!__9;ed':!£!ble __f~2~-~!l~-~~l2!!£.ab!~~~-!~~-­
next lower f!!~&~.t.end that, if we :e._~f~~!~Z-~!.!9;~;:~!£2'.! th~~t~!~~-~-~hou~d _ 
~~--~hat e~_£~~~~~-~f-the -~~i~P..~2£~~1!....!~.!.C~61~allL£~~£~~<!. __ ;_1!_~-·-­
serial order with all the rest. 
We must return and seek critically to estimate this 
great programme. The first point, of cons ide rat ion must be whether the 
laws of logic,usually so called, are really laws of being. 
-------------------------------------· 
* The Concept Of Consciousness,p.l4. 
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It is important to see,at the outset,that the Nee-Realists do not deny 
that these laws exist,and that they exist in us and that our thought is 
c governed by the~1 they simply insist that since our being is subsumed 
under a larger being,these laws which really are the ldWS of the larger 
unit exist in us beca;se we~~art of that larger 1 ife. ("Our nature is as 
much a fact of the existing world as anything."- Russell.) Now this I 
admit. I freely grant that if thought and thing are ever to be united 
the union will come from the insight that the world of things is cast 
in the same moulds as is the world of thought and that the inner world 
following freely ita impulses and laws grasps the outer world only because 
that outer world is essentially of the same kind and moves in the same 
curves as does the inner world. But this is not the point at which the 
Neo-Roalists are driving in this discussion. They are trying to make logic 
" 
supreme because they wish to demolish the idealistic theory of knowledge 
and because they wish to destroy,as an independent something,mind or 
consciousness,and to make the self simply a phase or aspect of the way 
in which the world acts. (Of course,Russell and the English Neo-Roalists 
do not 1 and as a consequence they land in subj ec·t iv is1n, but the American 
Neo-Realists do.) 
With Mr. Russell's position I feel that I have much 
in common,probably because of his Kantian proclivities,but to my thought 
his criticism of Kant's conclusions as to the validity of 'a priori' 
judgments -·is based upon a. far-fetched notion of change. He says: -''Apart 
from minor grounds on which Kant's philosophy may be criticised,there is 
one main objection which seems fatal to any attempt to deal with the prob-
lem of 'a priori'knowledge by this method.The thinlL!£ be a£2£~!.!~~<!_!~:;:­
is our certainty that the fact mu~ alwaY-s conf£~n.!-!£ lo~!5!._¥1d to aritl!= 
metic. To say .that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not 
account for this. Our nature is as much a fact of the existing 'vorld as 
anything, and there can be no certai!_!!~:_!!_!at _!.:L!!!!!.2:..£~ain constant. 
' It might happen that to-morrow,if Kant is right,our nature would so change 
as to make two and two become five.This possibility seems never to have 
occured to him,yet it is one which utterly destroys the certainty and 
universality which he is anxious to vindicate for arithmetical proposi-
IJR"'C'?P rermzz=aeomnrrz==!'rr=• , m. rm 
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tiona."* This is the strangest kind of reasoning. Indeed,it is an effort 
. 
to sustain reason by denying tt. All valid argumentation must rest upon 
what is, and not upon some conjectural "mieht", and the fact that, so far as 
we can see,the incessant changes of the past have wrought nothing contrary 
to reason adds an additional probability that it will not do so in the 
future. Are,then, the laws of thought also the laws of reality? Yes~surely, 
although they may not,do not,exhaust the laws which are in the universe, 
for there may be phases of existence dependent upon laws and conceptions 
to which nothing in us corresponds,or rather,to which our being is not 
adjustod,but within our limits of experience the world in order to be 
knowable by us must be so constructed that its processes are amenable 
• 
to our reason,or in other.wotds,within those limits the laws which govern 
the world of things must be the same as the laws which govern the world 
of thought,or else,on Mr.Russell'1own basis,our thought could never correct 
l~rasp the thing. 
There is one more point of importance,in this connec-
tion,to which ~'Ye must turn our attention. It is Mr. Russell's derivation 
of'universals'as 1neutrals 1 ,that is,as neither material or mental. He says: 
"Having now seen that there must be such entities as universals,the next 
point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is 
meant that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being 
thought or in any way apprehended by minds •.••••••.••••••••••• Consider 
such a propositionas 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a rela-
tion between two places,and it seems plain that the relation subsists 
independently of our knowledge of it •••••••••••••••••• The part of the 
earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the place where 
. London standa,even if there were no· human beings to know about north and 
south,and even if there were no minds at all in the universe ••••••••••• 
We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presup-
posed in the fact·that Edingurgh is north of London. But this fact invol-
ves the relation 'north of' which is ·a universal,and it would be impossible 
for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of' 
*The Problems of Philosophy,p.135. 
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which is a constituent part of the fact did involve anything mental. 
Hence we must admit that the relation 1 ike the terms' it relates, is not 
dependent upon thought,but belongs to the independent world which thought 
apprehends,but does not oreate. This conclusion,however,is not met _by the 
difficulty that .the relation 1 north of' does not seem to exist in the same 
sense in which Edinburgh and London exists ••••••••••••• There is no place 
or time \Vhere we can find the relation 1 north of' • It does not exist in 
Edinburgh any more than in London,for it relates the two and is neutral 
as between them •••••••••••••••••••••• It is neither in space nor in time, 
neither material nor mental;yet it is something."* His conclusion is that 
universals do not exist as objects exi~ 1 but that they subsist o~_hay~ 
beins~_just as Plato 1 s ideas.l:!'!~~g, in a ,realm by themselve~ Here we 
are touching the roots of Neo-Realism,in what is called 'the externality 
of relations',on the one hand;and in the 1neutral cntities 1 on the other. 
In criticism I proceed slowly,taking ite~ by item. In the first place,the 
statement that because a relation or a universal is independent of human 
thought,(a statement which cannot be granted as true) does not prove that 
the relation or the universal is independent of all. thought. We believe, 
indeed,that the objective relationships,space,time,identity,causality,et 
cetera,are independent of our minds,but that does not say that they are 
not dependent ~pon some mind,and further,since they are such that in 
experience our minds do grasp them,the presumption is valid that they 
are mental in origin. The correct conclusion would be that since these 
relationships do exist in the objective world and since they are manifestly 
not 1material 1 ,and since they likewise do exist in the human mind,which 
is certainly not a 1 neutral entity',they are doubly mental,that is, they 
indicate a mind in nature as well as in man. In the second place,the 
assertion that these relations are external to the terms is to make them 
as Mr,Bradley has pointed out,some sort of things,and then when these 
are related to others by some other relations they in their turn become 
things ,and so on,ad infinitum. You,have entered on an infinite regress 
which is an irrational procedure and condemns itself. 
* Ibid.pp.l52-156. 
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It is now time to return to Professor Holt and seek to understand 
his conception of these neutral entities,and how from them as·given the 
system of things is generated. Resuming his discussion in the Chapter on 
The Particular and The Universal he says:-"It is true that this general 
programme,logic as~umes the being of m~~y,so far distinct propositions. 
But it does not assert that such being is independent in the sense so 
often imputed by idealism. on· the contrary,logic is as eager to discover 
the dependence of any or all of these propositions on one fundamental 
proposition,if this be possible, -.as chemistry is to reduce the number 
of elements ••••••••••••••••• If all propositions can eventually be de-
duced from one fundamental proposition,it will have to be shown how a 
unified whole can contain contradictions.In short,error will have to be 
explained away. Since contradictions certainly are,there is at least a 
prejudice in favour of supposing that the universe of being is not a 
thoroughly unified whole •••••••••••••••••••• Thus we start provisionally, 
at least, with a pluralism of terms and propositions,all of which have 
a'distinct 1 ,though not necessarily an independenttibeing."* Here,indeed, 
we have the extreme of pluralism,for as yet no one has been able to reduce 
either propositions or elements into just a few,or to the goal - the one 
fundamental proposition or element. It is important to notice also that 
in spite of all that is said about the independence of the terms of their 
relations,relations have nevertheless to be'smuggled in' in order to get 
to propositions,that is,some sort of system or relationship has to be 
admitted at the start;for,indeed,there is no conceivable way of showing 
how terms which are independent should ever get into the relationship 
which should cause a proposition to be unless they were fundamantally 
related from the beginning. So,after all, Neo-Realism begins not with 
independent 'neutrals',but with a system,and the question how a system 
of related members is possible is one which the Nee-Realists do care 
to raise or to seek to answer,since it is impossible except through the 
agency of a co-ordinating mind,whic~ posits and maintains the members in 
their mutual relations. 
But an even greater proolem confronts these thinkers 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p.51. 
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in _the fact that the world not stat ic;but is in a state of constant 
. 
becoming. Change is omnipresent. And the problem is how to get motion into 
these terms and propositions. And the riddle is solved by simply postu-
lating that certain propositions are recurrent. "The existence in a system 
not only of complex,but also of new simple terms can be deduced from a 
certain kind of proposition,namely the kind that postulates a recurrence • 
.•••••••••••• The variety of such recurrent propositions is seemingly as 
endless as the series of terms that each generates."(p.ll.) What is really 
done in this exposition is to mistake the fact that the mind may repeat 
its operations over almost anything in a serial order for an objective 
and'ontological recurrence. At any rate,the fact of change is provided 
for by simply postulating it as an original endowment of these 'neutral' 
enti~ies. Mr. Holt is very fond of this notion of recurrence and dwells 
upon it-again and again. For instance:- "That peculiar agency,once again, 
which seems inhe;-_ent in recurrent and other deduc"!!,ive ~~ceases is a fea-
ture that is espeq~lly worth noti~~· The siven terms and ErOEOBiti~ 
'5enerate 1 what we know as the system of valid deductions or consequences. 
It seems to be thi~~e±ativelr_!ndeEenden!_~ctivitr of the ~ystem itself 
that the mathematician or loaician follows .~s he would trace the course 
·of a river,when he ded~~es br ~ogi~~1 necess!tx hitherto hidden fea~ure~ 
of the Sl~em thal_he is studr!n~"(p.l4.) So far,then,we have terms rela-
ted into propositions and these have an inherent power of generation. 
The next necessary step is to provide for some order 
or law according to which this gen~ration or unfolding takes place. This 
is found in 1 logical necessity.' ."Everything which is not logically neces-
sary in a system,is found in the end not to have being in that system,for 
the latter contains only so much as the given terms arid propositions do 
generate,and to this alone does the thinker find it necessary to conform 
his thought. _ •••• ,., ••••••••••.•••••.••••••• And, similarly ,deduct ion is 
the thinker's name for his own act of conforming his thought to the rela-
tively independent activity of the propositions that generate his system." 
(p.l4.) Here t-hen,at last, the outfit is complete. 
10. 
Terms are re~ted into_prOROSitionsJsome of which have th~ inherent power 
of seneration,and these in their unfoldi!!ure ~OV«!rned ~t_j}le -~~'!S Of-~&!_Q. 
Now as this might readily be interpreted in an idealistic fashion the 
next thing is to show that terms or logical concepts are by no means •men-
tal1,but that they are 1neutral' in their nature;and,then, finally,to set 
forth that the,essence of things is the same,that is,neutral substance. 
, We hav'e now reached the end of the deduct ion and we have come to this that 
the universe is a neutral system,which by its various ways of acting founds 
the two great aspects of mind and matter. This dualism,however,is a matter 
of appearance only,in reality there is but one substance -the neutral en-
tities,or if you will,an extreme of pluralism,for no way has been suggested 
whereby these entities can be reduced to one fundamental neutral entity. 
But we have been moving a little too rapidly on the 
"Neutral Mosaic" and we must retrace our steps and see how Professor Holt 
makes out that concepts are not mental,but neutral,that is,if he makes it 
out.And,from the very start,the answer must be that he does not makitut, 
he merely asserts it,unless,like Mr. Russell,h~eans that because our 
minds are evidently parts of the world-oystem and in a measure determined 
in their activities,channels,as it were, whereby the fundamental power 
of the world expresses itself,therefore the result of our mental activity 
ought not to be called mental,but ought to be named according to the 
power which it expresses in this case 'neutral entities'. This,however 
would be a rather far-fetched use of language,and the whole argument 
red.uces itself to an arbitrary change of name,which itself does not _change 
any fact,for that passivity of mind which is required,if possible, would 
make impossible his whole theory. But further,Professor Holt seems to be 
laboring under the notion that idealism depends in its doctrine of mind 
upon some sort of'mind-stuff',as some raw-material from which minds are 
made. That this is an untenable notion,held by no idealistic thinker needs 
hardly be mentioned. He says:-"We have seen that atAeast some of the enti-
ties that are in our minds are logical concepts,and among these there is 
no question of substance,for they are all of one substance,neutral stuff, 
if it must be mentioned at all. And it is not far-fetched to ask whether 
Ef§ & 5jr 
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perhaps,all the other entities that compose our mental coiJ,tent are of 
' that selfsame nature. Doubtless many persons would assent at once,and 
would declare that they are,but meaning by that that logical concepts 
are all 1mental 1 and.hence of one texture with the ideas. This is precise-
ly the reverse of what I mean,and I have tried repeatedly to show that 
these logical ·entities,that are in minds,to be sure, are no more made 
of mental stuff than a man who happens to be in a regiment is made of 
regimental stuff. A regiment is made of flesh and bones(and other things), 
but flesh and bones could not be defined as,nor are they,regimental stuff. 
The concepts simply are just that which they are."* Mr. Holt has failed 
· to show anywhere how that which is in the mind (logical concepts) is 
distinct and different from the mind (as neutral entities) and any number 
of,passages may be cited where the concepts appear as the result of the 
mental activity,the "Concept of Consciousness"itself certainly presupposes 
this. But,furthermore, it is not possible anywhere to separate the agent 
from the agency,for every kind of being must finally be defined by the 
way that being acts,and since conceptual thought,even according to Pro-
fessor James,is of the essence of mind,it seems that so far the neutral 
entities,logically speaking, are certainly the most mental things in 
existence. It may be permissible to add that merely to insist on "isness" 
is not carrying the explanations of things very far. 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p.l03. 
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In the second ElaceLwe are to consider what constitutes the essence or 
the real nature of thinss - "The Substance of Matter". 
After having discussed modern chemical and electrical 
theories Professor Holt proceeds as follows:- "Now these very persona, 
to leave physics for metaphysics,may perhaps be the last to admit that 
an electron is a c~ncept. 1 Not a concept',they will say, 1 but a real thing', 
as if this were an antithesis. Physicists,however,while some of them are 
experts in the analysis of matter,are not so well qualified to give ver-
dic't as to the nature of reality and of concepts. As the botanist analyses 
the structures of vegetable organisms and finds the chemical compounds 
of which they are built,but does not analyse them;so the ordinary chemist 
analyses.these compounds down to their elements,but does not analyse these; 
and. so the physical chemist analyses these elemental atoms,as now appears 
into minuter components (motiona,maases,electrons) which he in turn must 
leave to the mathematician and to the logician further to analyse. On the 
hierarchy of entities according to their degree of complexity must rest 
any natural classification of the sciences. And thus while we must learn 
from the physicist how it is that matter consists only of electrons or 
other masses,we do not turn to him for information as to the metaphysical 
status of these,his own last elements. Whither then? Well,obviously to 
.. 
that science which the physicist himself declares to be the next more 
. ' 
fundamental than his own,mathematical logic. Most of his entities are 
laws,and these are equationa,which are mathematical entitiea,or logical 
concepts. So,too, are his apace,his poin~s,his capacities,his masses, 
and whatsoever else he may declare to be for him fundamental and in his 
science not further analysable. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Any 
further argument need scarcely be offered to show that the elements to 
which the physicist ha~ lengt~ reduced matter are neutral entities. 
They are the products of such minute analyais,are so strikingly remote 
from concrete wood and stone,that nearly everyone will grant that they 
are metaphysically of one piece with Euclidian space and the integral 
x. a 
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_ calculus 2 with .which the:t ,are so int imat el:z bound up."* This is a . 
remarkable passage in what it takes for granted. Professor Holt simply 
asserts that when the physicist has analysed 1 matter 1 as far as can.be 
done and comes,not to an old-fashioned atom or "tennis-ball" but ·to an 
'electron',of which Sir Oliver Lodge thinks 'it very unlikely; •••••••• 
that it contains a material nucleus.· in addition to its charge' ,and finds 
that this electron of activity behaves according to certain rules,which 
are capable of being stated in mathematical terms; Professor Holt then 
simply asserts,! say 1 that therefore that electron is a mathematical or 
logical entity and he crosses the chasm brilliantly by a leap in the air. 
To be sure,we may well understand that Professor Holt is of the impression 
that he has shown logical concepts and laws to be active neutral entities 
and,thinks that,at this point,he is at liberty to equate these values 
and say that since electrons are entities which behave logically therefore 
they are logical entities of an active nature,but the problem is not quite 
as easy as that. In the first place,Professor Holt has never shown that 
propositions are active,or even recurrent,he has simply asserted that they 
are ,he has assumed that the fundamental thing is of the nature of a recur-
rent proposition. Now,as a matter of fact,no i~ance has ever been shown 
where "A repeats itself" ,and unless you assume a perfectly static universe 
(and Professor Holt does not,for he definitely declares for the fact of 
change) ~ecurrence is impossible: and ,secondly,it is,at the best,only 
" 
assumed that the activity of the electron is of the same kind as the as 
the logical activity. This latter point,is,surely,very ~uch in need of 
proof. We believe,indeed,that the electron acts mathematically and logic-
ally;and that the nature of a thing is determined by the law which"governs 
the foro and the sequence of its activity", but until we are more enlighte-
ned as to the"activity o~ propositions" we refuse to believe that a thing 
is not something more than a logical concept or a neutral entity. As I 
shall hope to show later these f~ndamental neutral entities are unwarranted 
abstractions,from which,juat as from a juggler's hat you may get any 
number of things,simply because all that is to co~e out has previously 
been stuffed in. It may be true that things are"energized thoughts",but 
* Ibid.pp.ll7-ll9. 
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. that conclusion can not be reached by a person ·who refuses tq go beyond 
"neutral concepts",and w~o has no place for mind either in God or man. 
On this point I wish to quote as specially pertinent the_ fol-
lowing passage from Professor Bowne's"Metaphysics."* Speaking concerning 
the ·nature of reality,he says:-"If it were possible for us to get a per-
fect formula for. the naturE/of anything, that formula would not be the natu1·e 
as· real·, but the nature as conceived. The ineffable difference between a 
thought and a thing would remain an impassible gulf for h~~an thought. 
But this is only our ancient admission that we cannot make reality,nor 
tell how it is made. Hence,whatever the nature of reality may be,whether 
quality or law,it can appear in our minds only as conceived,and never as 
the reality itself. And since we can only think about things,not make them, 
the ·only possible question is,Must we think of this nature under the form 
of a quality,or as a law or rule of action? The attempt to think of itas 
a quality fails,and we decide that the form of our thought must be that 
of a law of action. This is the only conception which provides for change 
. 
and action. The further question,how a law can be set in reality so that, 
from being a thought,it becomes a thing,involvee the mystery of creation, 
or of absolute being,and we do not pretend to know how being is made." 
According to Professor Holt two gteat ?bjections are 
' liable to be offered against his conception of the"aubstance of matter". 
The first is"that neutral entities can in no wise have that inflexibility 
and that indestructibility that eo signally characterize matter. The 
neutral concepts,it will be said,are as easily summoned and dismissed in 
idle fancy as are sensations and ideas but not eo matter." To this 
hie answer is "that tangibly seizing or not seizing a physical obJect is 
the parallel process to 1thinking'or not thinking a neutral entity", and 
that when thus dealing with these entities in thought "one will soon 
discover that the seemingly more pliant entities of logic and mathematics 
offer the same inexorable resist~ce to any merely subjective familiari-
ties,as do the concrete masses and forces of the physicist. The former 
are not a whit less obedient to their own laws. We may think of a circle 
and a . straight line,and desire in fancy to make the straight line cut~ 
* p .40. 
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. th~ circle threttimes. It will not do so." To the contentiqn that our 
conceptions are not lawleas,but that they are as strictly determined as 
-.. 
are the operations_ of the external world, there neither ia,nor can there 
be any objection from the side of idealism. The laws of the logical mind 
are as inexorable as are the ·physical laws,and there are no chance result~ 
The concept triangle is the same to-day 1 yeaterday and foreyer,and this 
follows,naturally 1 from the idealistic position that the ultimate substance 
of the world is an infinite mind;but the contention that"seizing a physi-
cal object is the parallel process to thinking a neutral entity" - that 
is a different matter. Perhaps psychological criticism is as yet not in 
order 1 s inca we have not arri.ved at the "concept of consciousness" which 
dominates this discussion throughout 1 but it is pe_rt inent to point out that 
a"parallelism"has no place in a system where there is no difference 
between mind and matter -for all activity is the activity of the neutral 
system 1 and both "seizin~" and "thi~i~" are ultimately only nervous 
reaction~that is, they are identical. But more of this later. 
The next objection is based on what Professor Holt 
believes to be the mistaken notion that each self is a separate entity 
and that therefore these logical entities are not readily accessible. To 
this his answer is that "one may say with some faint appearance of plau-
sibility that one's emotions cannot be experienced by other persons, but 
it is perfec:ly patent that numbers,geometrical figures,and,in short,all 
the abstract entities of sciences can be passed around like beetles or 
postage stamps." How this may be done w~ll be explained by Professor Holt 
when we come to study the phenomenon of consciousness 1 hence I will delay 
the criticism which I wish to offer until that time and proceed to examine 
the real source of all this matter - the late Professor James and his 
"radical empiricism" and more particularly,as the hidden spring of this 
whole movement his conception of consciousness. In his now famous essay 
entitled "Does Consciousness Exis~?* he said:-"For twenty years past I 
have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity;for seven or eight years 
past I have suggested its non-existence to my students,and tried to give 
them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. 
* Essays In Radical Empiricism - Chapter I. 
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. '1It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly an<l universally 
discard·ed •••••••••.••••••••• Let me then immediately explain that I mean 
C-.' 
only to deny that the word stands for an entity,but to insist most empha-
tically that it does stand for a function. There is~I mean ,no aboriginal 
stuff or quality of being,* contrasted with that of which material objects 
are made, out of which our thoughts. of them are made;but there is a func-
tion in experience which thoughts perform,and for the performance of which 
this quality of being is involved •••••••••••••••• My thesis is that if 
we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or ma-
terial in the world,a stuff of which everything is composed,and if we call 
that stuff 1pure experience',then knowing can easily be explained as a 
particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of 
pure" experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience 
one of its terms becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge,the 
knower,** the other becomes the object kno,m." After- having reviewed some 
of the objections which believers in mind or consciousness as a real . 
. 
entity have offered to this programme,especially the fact that 1mind 1 and 
'matter' are fundamentally different,and that 1the existence of conscious-
ness ••••••• _ ••••• can neither be defined nor deduced from anything but 
itself', he proceeds as follows:- "Now my contention is exactly the 
reverse of this. Experience,! believe has no such inner duplicity; and 
the separation of it into consciousness and content comes,not by way of 
subtraction,but by way of addition ••••••••••• The paint will also 
serve here as an illustration. In a_ pot in a paint-shop,along with other 
paints,it serves in its entirety as so much saleable matter. Spread on 
a canvas;.with other paints around it, it represents on the contrary a 
feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. Just so,I main-
tain,does a given undivided portion of experience,taken in one context 
of associates ,play the part of a kno,ver, of a state of mind, of 1 conscious-
ness';while in a different contex~,the same undivided bit of experience 
plays the part of a thing known,of an objective 1 content 1 • In a word,in 
one group it figures as a thought,in another group as a thing."*** 
* Foot-note,"Similarly,there is no "activity"of 1 coneciousness,as such ... 
** '' '1 ,"In my Psychology I have tried to show that we need no knower 
*** . / other than the passing thought." Essays In Radical EmpirJ.cism,pp. 3_10• 
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. • Here we find the heart of Neo-Realism. "The fact is~ ,.says Pro-
fessor Holt, "that both minds and physical objects are,and are real, and 
they are composed of one and the same substance - neutral stuff."· 
In this account of Professor James' there are three assumptions which I 
wish· to look at rather closely,using the criticisms as an introduction 
to the general critical summary of those Neo-Realistic positions which we 
have discussed so far. 
The first assumption made by Professor James is. that there 
is such a thing as"one primal stuff or material in the world" and that 
this may be called "pure experience". Of course he does not. mean the 
experience of the Absolute for whom some such notion may be possible,but· 
what he means is just experience in general., a pure abstract ion, which, 
like"Hegel's "thought" goes on and does things,experiencing things,but is 
in no sense dependent upon any thinker. It is this abstract ion., this pre-
cious"fallacy of the universal 11which enables the Pragmatists and the Nee-
Realists to go on doing business by constantly shifting its loans in this 
. 
impersonal manner. If they were compelled to think concretely and had 
to face the fact that experience is a word which must be used with the 
adjectives "mine"and "thine",the notion would soon evaporate. This one 
"primal stuff"i.s simply the last abstraction of our logic and the diffi-
culty comes from mistaking this for the first and essential form of real 
existence - "logical subordination is mistaken for ontological implica-
tion." There is no primal stuff either physical or mental,each experience 
is concrete and individual,and from the side of "pure experience" it is 
absolutely impossible to reduce the complexity and the change which 
admittedly are constant and omipresent to anything single and unitary. 
Such reductions as the idealists are wont to make are irrelevant here 
since minds are not admitted as real. 
The second assumption is that mind or consciousness may, 
' ,: 
if we are willing to follow his p~an,be discarded, - "we need no knower 
other than the passing thought." As this position is considerably amplified 
in the chapter "On The Function Of Cognition" in his book"The Meaning of 
Truth",! shall quote a few passages so as to get this clearly before us. 
** ** "ijZ±+· 
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·He says: -"We shall simply assume that cognition is produced somehow and 
1 imit ourselves to asking what elements it contains ••••••••• Now it is 
to be observed that the common consent of mankind has agreed that some 
feelings are cognitive and some are simple facts •••••••••• now,how can 
our little feeling (q) be said to have any sort of cognitive function? 
For it to know there must be something to be known ••••••••••• For the 
feeling to be cognitive in a specific sense,then, it must be self-trans-
cendent and we must prevail upon t~e god to create a reality outside of 
it to correspond to its intrinsic quality (q). If now the new-created 
reality resembles the feeling's quality (q) I say that the feeling may 
be held by us to be cognizant of that reality.''* "Now our supposed little 
feeling gives a what;and if other feelings should succeed which remember 
the first,its what may stand as subject and predicate of some piece of 
knowledge-about,of some judgment,perceiving relations between it and 
. . 
other whats which the other feelines may know. The hitherto dumb ~ will 
then receive a name and be no longer speechless ••••••••••••• If there 
. be in the universe a q,other than the q in the fe~ling,the latter may 
have acquaintance with an entity ejective to itself; an acquaintance, 
moreover,which,as mere acquaintance,it would be hard to imagine suscep-
tible either of improvement or increase,being in its way complete; and 
which would oblige us (so long as we refuse not to call acquaintance 
knowledge) t5> say not only that the feeling is cognitive,but that all 
qualities of feeling;so long as there is anything outside of them which 
they resemble are feelings of qualities of existence,and perceptions of 
outward fact."** 
Let us now seek to examine the· content of these passages. 
As we have already seen Professor James expressly says that it is not neces 
sary to have a unitary mind as a real condition of knowledge but the 
feeling q and its various acquaintances are sufficient,that is,if there 
is another q in the universe,"and,if other feelings should succeed which 
remember the firat",the conditions of knowledge or of the judgment would 
be fulfilled. Here we have the old sensationalistic quibble all over again 
except that for sensations James subst itues "feelings". 
* The Meaning of Truth,p.9. ** Ibid,p.l4,ff. 
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·tt must be seen,however,that he qualifies by the use of the adjective 
"cognitive", that is, what he subtracts fom the noun he adds in the adjective 
so that his feelings are the equivalent of thought anyway,but he entirely 
fails to recognize,that these feelings are,indeed,mental products, -that 
the work of the mind penetrates to those elementary reactions which we 
call sensations,and that a sensation apart from the interpretation and 
construction which thought gives it could result only in some sort of 
affection of the sense-organs. But even if we should grant that these 
feelings are real and·are cognitive we would.not be advanced in any way 
because in order that this theory should get into working shape it is 
necessary that these little q's of feeling should be able to recognize 
the work of a past feeling. In other words,memory must be provided for, 
and that means that each particular cognitive meaning must be a mind, 
and thus we are facing the fact that Professor James must produce an 
untold number of minds each day in order to account for the one persona-
lity. If this horn of the dilemma is not accepted then the following 
criticism seems pertinent. "How to get particular impressions to recognize 
one another,and how from the juxtaposition of particular units of feeling 
to evolve a knowledge of their relation without invoking some superior 
principle has always been a problem of exceeding difficulty. The theorist 
however,managea beautifully by mistaking his own knowledge of what is to 
be done for a development of that knowledge by the impressions themselves." 
• • . . • . • • • • • • • • • . • • "That a particular conception, say inkstand, should so 
distinguish or identify itself as to become aware of other particular 
conceptions,~s chair 1 table,tree,house,and have opinions about them would 
be a performance worth seeing. But if our view is to escape this tedious 
in1bec ili ty, then our self -distinguishing, self-identifying thought 'must be 
conceived as something above particular thoughts,as having,comparing,and 
judging them,and as abiding through them."* On Professor James' premises 
the judgment,as a free and undetermined act,becomes impossible,and we 
land in a necessitarianism which makes truth impossible as well,since 
it cannot be distinguished from error;and further,neither the pragmatist 
nor the neo-realist,nor,for that matter,anyone else is at liberty so to 
* Th~ory _Of Thought And Knowledge; Bowne,pp.24-25. 
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· interpret experience that the jud;gment becomes meaningless· and then later 
argue for truth. Necessitarianism may be true but its advocates are by 
the logic of their position committed to eternal silence. 
The third assumption which has not anything whereby to 
support it self is the' monistic' theory. What we have is, in reality, an 
extreme'pluralism',which may be reduced to the same position to which 
Hume reduced the sensationalism of his time, - to impressions,that is, 
to these different units of "feeling" ,to these different "pulses of experi-
ence"which are in constant flow. To be sure,Professor James openly pro-
fesses a pluralism,but he does not stick to this position when he comes 
to develop his theory of knowledge,there he is a dualist in order to get 
the inner q "to hit" the outer q~ but,then, Professor James also frankly 
" disavows .any endeavor after consistency,he feels free to make fresh as-
swnpt ions whenever he has need of them •. 
Before leaving this subject I wish to point out,briefly, 
the starting-points of Nee-Realism as I see them in the philosophy of 
Professor James. 
First ,the "stuff of pure experience" ,or the "different 
pulses of experience" become the ''neutral entities"of the American 
Nee-Realists. (Pluralistic Universe ,pp. 364-365. Essays in Radical Empiri-
cism,p.l40.) 
Second, his concept ion that "a given U.'1divided po_rt ion of 
experience taken in one context of associates,plays the part of a knower, 
of a state of mind,of consciousness,while in a different context,the same 
undivided bit of experience plays the part of the thing known" gives the 
basis for the"Concept of Conciousness" as understood by Professor Holt 
and the Nee-Realists.( Essays in Radical Empiricism,pp.3-10.) See also 
Concept of Consciousness,p.xiii. Present Philosophic Tendencies, Appendix, 
p.353. 
ThirdL the theory of knowledge promulgated in the various 
essays in "The Meaning of Truth" and other recent books leads directly 
to the position held by P~ofessor Holt that truth is found whenever a 
nervous system by a specific response defines a cross-~ection of neutral 
' ~ 
i 
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·entities,that is,when thought and.thing are identical·,or "nearly so". 
S~ys Professor James:-"Cognition,whenever we take it concretely,means 
determinate ambulation through intermediaries, from a terminus a qu~ to, 
or towards,a terminus ad quem. 11 *"But if our private vision of the paper 
be considered in abstraction from every other event ••••••••• then the 
paper seen and the seeing of it are only two names for one indivisible 
fact,which properly named is the datum,the phenomenoTh or the experience. 
The paper is in tne mind and the mind is around the paper,because paper 
and mind are only two names that are given later to the one experience. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . To know immediately,then,or intuitively is for mental con-
tent and object to be identical."** The maximal conceivable truth in an 
idea ''ould seem to be that it should lead to an actual mereing of oursel ve.s 
with the object,to an utter mutual confluence and identification ••••••• 
I 
.•••••• Total conflux of the mind with the reality would be the absolute 
limit of truth,there could be no better or more satisfying knowledge than 
that."*** ( * The Meaning of Truth,p .140't*Ibid,p .49. ***Ibid,p:•l55, ff.) 
Fourth4 the doctrine of the "externality of relations" as 
held by the American nee-Realists, is clearly stated by Professor .James. 
One quotation will prove sufficient. In the chapter entitled Conclusions, 
the last chapter in "A Pluralistic Universe" he says:- "Pragmatically 
interpreted,pluralism or the doctrine that it is many means only that 
the sundry parta of reality may be externally related. Everything you can 
- • __ w_...__ .... ____ ,.._.._. ____ .. • 
think of,however vast or inclusive,has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 
'external'environment of some sort or amount ••••••••••••••.••. The plural-
istic world is thus more like a federal repuclic than like an empire or 
a kingdom. Howeverr.auch may be collected,hovtever much may report itself 
as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action,something 
else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity • ........ ,,,,, 
• • • • • • If a thing \Vera once disconnected, it could never be connected 
again,according to monism. The pragmatic difference between the two systems 
is thus a definite one. It is just thus,that if once'a' is out of sight 
of 'b' ,or out of touch with it,or,more briefly, 'out' of it at all, then, 
23. 
·according. to monism, it must alway.13 remain so,they can never get together; 
whereas pluralism admits that on another occasion they may work together, 
c• 
·or in some way be connected again." (The Pluralistic Universe,pp.321-323) 
In his chapter on "The Neutral Mosaic",Profeasor Holt 
undertakes'to to lay bare "the backbone" or "the skeleton" of the universe 
and to show how a"neutral universe can contain both physical and mental 
objects." He says: -"In coming now to survey the realm of the neutral en-
tities, the neutral mosaic,we recall that these entities,just as in any 
logical system,are graded in a strict an~nalienable order of complexities 
••••••••• ••••••. The first entities are the simple ones and we may call 
-those the fundamental entities. Precisely what these are,we are,as a 
race,even yet scarcely in a position to state. Yet we seem vaguely to 
have made out that the concepts of identity,of difference,of number,and 
of the negative are more fundamental than most others,and are among the 
relatively simple in the order of complexities ••......••.••• But if our 
human experience has not extended to the fundamental end,if end there be, 
of the simple,complex hierarchy,there is a considerable range along this 
complexity series,with which we may truly pretend to some slight and ten-
tative acquaintance. Firstly,the relatively simple entities are,agreeably 
to our view of the particular and the universal,the relatively universal. 
Here we find the already long acknowledged logical and mathematical enti-
ties,and those in special that the students of order are now rather 
busily discovering. Then comes the innumerable algebras rather ala-
borated cases of order. 11 • The remaining expos it ion is given to an eluc i-
dation of the reasons why Comte's classification of the sciences,with 
modern additions,gives us the real order of neutral development. Its 
characteristic law is that entities find their place in the neutral series 
according to the degree of their complexity,that is,the more complex a 
thing is the higher up in the graded series does it belong. The following 
order gives this outline of the universe~- order,number,geometry,kine-
matics,statics,mechanics,energetics,inorganic chemistry,organic chemistry, 
biology,psychology,sociology,ethics,esthetics, The point of importance is 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
* The Concept of Consciousnesa,p.l55. 
that in this simple-to-complex order any point to the right will involve 
all the point,to the left,or all the points which have preceedea it in 
the order of being. 
As a last,but very important matter,Professor Holt discus-
sea the question of what is commonly spoken of as"gaps" or "breaks" in 
this evolutionary aeries. He says:- "Three places in the series from simple 
to complex entities,so far, '"'ould have looked,not so very long ago, like 
actual ·gaps -- th'e transition from mathematics to space,from space to 
mechanics (matter) and from physics to chemistry. But we come now to the 
transition that would once have seemed an even more hopeless breach. It 
is from inorganic to organic substance,to vegetable and animal life. In 
spit'e of the nee-vitalists, it is to-day perfectly clear that life is de-
finable in terms of chemical processes;although,confessedly,this defini-
tion has not bee~ctually ascertained. Life is some sort of chemical ~ro­
cess~nd nothi~B.further •••••••••••••••• This region of the complexity 
series ;a for us a critical place,for here,of course, appears that type 
of complex entity called consciousness or mind. It is here that I shall 
undertake to show that, once agai-q ~..!.~:£~-is_B_~reak in the series j that 
no new su£!3-~~q~~s here and that the £~!!.~£!~£~S q~~~~~~!_~£~ be 
readily and ~om:Ele~~z~~ined in !~~.-~f. the enU~!~!!~!_~a~e 4a~ll~~~~ 
before."* "Thus we vaguely make out ,not merely that all being, ey~n in 
its form so-diverse as mind and matter,consists,indeed,of one neutral 
substance (for that, it seem·a to me, is perfectly assured) but also that 
these neutral entities are marvellously compacted in a united system such 
that the simple dev~l~E without break or discontinuity into the more and 
oore comple~ 1.even down to the infinite div~~l. of concrete be in~.:. ••••• 
•••••••••••• The successive closing in of the apparent gaps of the 
simple-to-complex series of beings brings it more and more within the 
limits of probability that we shall one day learn that all being is a 
single,infinite,deductive system in which the entire variety devEHops 
deductively from a re2:_at ively very s1aall number of fundamental propos i-
t ions. • ••••••••••• The great· fact ·is, the~~ that the infinite mosaic of 
being is neither subjective nor' objective in substance,but i~ neutral, 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p:l55,ff. 
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that it is ordered, t~t ,it devel0-26 unceasinglt of itf! own znot i~) ,and 
!hat,as our k~owled~e advances w~~ave more and more reason to beli~~ 
that its uni~y is comElete~"~ 
We have now reached the place \vhere,like the seaman,· 
we must make some "observations" and complete our'' ''reckoning" in order 
that we may find our latitude and longitude see where we really are. 
And it .may be pertinent to remark that,as we have seen from our study of 
" 
Professors James' writings,that this whole way of thinking shows its 
origin as from the hand of the psychological experimentalist. Just as the 
materialism of Herbert Spencer has the earmarks of the physicist1and the 
biologists whose apologist he became,so this whole scheme of thought is 
the resultant of observations and classifications of "reactions", the 
nervous reactions to external stimuli • The whole movement,indeed, is in 
itself a reaction,a swing of the pendulum,from the materialistic thought 
of the last century toward a conception of being more closely affiliated 
with some types of idealism. The affinity,however,is not very far reachin& 
the real structure of the thing is almost identically the same as the 
structure of the materialistic evolutionist of the more intelligent kind. 
Just as this latter started his universe by the trinity of matter,force, 
and law, where matter in the form of star-dust or imperceptible atoms 
gave the substance,and where force inherent in matter,furnished the ne-
"' cessary motion,and whore the order,also inherent in the atoms,gave the 
sense of guidance and of direction,so the Nee-Realist of Professor Holt's 
type starts his universe by"neutral entities"\vhich furnish the"fundamentum" 
or the substance of the world,and since the supposed discovery has been 
made that some propositions are active or have the power"to come back," 
this recurrence inherent in the fundamental neutrals furnishing the driv-
ing power, the motion, and since order also inheres in the "self-activity 
of propositions"this order furnishes the law of development. ,.The great 
' fact is that the infinite mosaic of being ••••••••••••• is neutral,that 
it is ordered,that it develops unceasingly of its own motion."(Holt.) 
As against this whole scheme of thought,then,I offer the following points 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p.l63,ff. 
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of criticism. 
In the first place,the identification of our logical 
processes with the ontological· processes of the universe,an identification 
which is both assumed and asserted all through this book, I believe to 
be unwarranted by the facts of experience. For the sake of placing the 
issue clearly before us the following quotation from Professor Holt is 
in order. He says:- "The parallelism between logical and natural neces-
I ' 
oities must be admitted,but on any dualistic theory it can be explained 
only by assuming ad hoc a pre-established harmony ••••••••••••.•• But the 
cases of parallelism where the logical deduction from premises correspond 
with the actual behaviour of the physical objects,are now self-explained. 
The "t;vo oo-called 'mental' and 'real' system correspond in so far as they 
are identical (and we must remember that according to ·Professor Holt they 
are always identical) and in so far they will,of course,run parallel,even 
down to the remotest deductions. In ot~er w~rd~t~~usalitz_and ~o&ical_ 
necessity are one."* This identification is based upon Professor James' 
famous me-t_aphor "how one identical point can be on two lines",and it is 
by a skilful exegesis of this figure of speech that this striking paradox 
that one thing can be in two places at the same time,a fallacy which 
underlies all of American Neo-Realism,can seemingly be maintained. It 
would seem incumbent upon us,therefore,to return to Professor James and 
examine his arguoent •. James was trying to make out that the room in which 
he was seated and his 'image 1 of th~ room were really identical and this 
in order to provide for the immediacy of knowledge and in order to show 
. 
that no mental representations are necessary. He said:-"The puzzle of 
how the one identical room can be in two places is just the puzzle of how 
one identical point can be on two lines. It can be if it be situated at 
their intersection;and,similarly,if the "pure experience'' of the room were 
a place of intersection of two processes,which connected it with different 
groups of associates respectively,'it would be counted twice over,as 
belonging to either group,and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, 
although it would remain all the time a numerically single thing."** 
This point on the two linea is pure fancy and fable as a moment of thought 
will show,and yet on this metaphor a whole philosophy id built. 
*The Concept of Consciousness,p.l32.**Essays in Radical Empiricism,p.l2. 
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Now by way of criticism it must be pointed out that neither points nor 
linea exist, only cubes and other solids have existence. Now let us sup-
pose that two cubes intersect i in such case the plain fact is that ·one cube 
divides the other,and to that extent excludes the other. Of course,it is 
possible to carve out from one piece a figure which would resemble two 
intersecting cubea,but in that case there would not be two but one, and, 
further,there would be no"intersection". On some such figure this notion 
is built,and is,of course, imaginary and untenable. But to return to 
Professor Holt and his identification of the logical and tbe ontological. 
While we cannot grant that "causality and logical necessity are one",we 
can grant that the laws of logic are also to be found in reality,thus pro-
' viding for our knowledge of the real worldibut what we cannot grant is 
that our logical classifications and general concepts have their identical 
double in the ontological series. This whole view is a corruption of 
_Hegel. For an absolute reason whose thoughts are so energized that they 
are also- things,aome such identification is possible, but Professor Holt 
has no place for any absolute,and,hence,when we ar·e speaking of"logical 
necessity"and the "classification of the sciences" we are dealing with 
our logical operations,and to say that"cauaality",or the driving power 
of the universe,and our logical nature,or that dialectic which is imma-
nent in thought,to say,I repeat that this is one and identical is plain 
nonsense,foreven if we should grant what Professor Holt is driving at -
the passivity of mind,so that our thought expresses,not some activity on 
our part, but simply one of the ways in which the universe acts, even so 
it must be admitted ( and Professor Holt admits it repeatedly) that there 
is a vast difference between the way the universe acts when it thinks 
in some human being and the way in which it acta in an earthquake or the 
way it acts in interplanetary mot ions The difference, the ineffable differ-
ence between "thought "and "thing" is not solved by merely positing their 
identity. This whole positio~ was' st1fkingly refuted by Professor Bowne. 
He said:-"By an analysis of the space intuition we build up the system 
of· geometry as a necessary implication. It is conceivable that in like 
manner the notion of being implie:.a the whole scheme of concrete existence 
0_-.,-~-====================================~-=-==-=-~·====~~~------------------~,.~~ 
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as a rational necesaity,or what comes to the same thing,that the system 
of reason implies the actual world with all its concrete details. Analysis, 
however,fails to reveal the necessity. No reflection upon the bare notion 
of being will reveal anything beyond the formal categories of quality 
and causation. Pure being refuses to unfold or differentiate. No formal 
category enables us to deduce any specific application whatever. Pure 
space accounts for figures in space. Pure time explains no event in time. 
The idea of motion provides for no specific movements. The category of 
causation alone contains no particular effects. Reason as a SJStem of 
principles is only a.formal outline of possibility,and contains nothing 
specific and actual. The actual is found not deducedjit is a fact of ex-
) 
perience,not an implication of reason. Within tho objective order alone 
we find three factors which we cannot connect with any logical bond. We 
have first the necessary truths orcategories of reason. Their pre~nce ~ 
as laws both in the inner and outer world,unitea the two realms and 
makes communication.possible. But these categories only outline a possible 
existence and do not contain the concrete reality as a necessary implica-
tion. We have next certain general lavlB of cosmic procedure. These cannot 
be deduced from the categories of reason,though they are specifications 
under them. For instance the various forms of force are specifications 
of the general category of causality, but no consideration of the latter 
will yield the former. The actual existence a~d nature of these general 
laws have to be admitted as a fact without any hope of deducing them 
as rational necessities. Finally,neither the categories of reason nor 
the general laws contain any account of the detail~d facta of existence. 
No reflection upon the eternal truths of reason or the general cosmic 
laws would deduce a boulder,or any other concrete fact. These have to 
be admitted as opaque facta,so far as reason is concerned;and if we 
will have an explanation it can be found only in the not ion of purpose."* 
-----------.,--.-------·----------
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The next criticism which I wish to offer upon this programme 
is that no real explanation is made of the world-process by the attempted 
reduction of things to the lowest logical forms. For in the first place, 
as we have seen,there is absolutely no guarantee that the ontological 
processes of the w9rld originated with neutral entities which were repeti-
tive in their nature,for as far as present knowledge is concerned these 
conceptions ar~ simply abst-ractions from the way some hul'!lan intelligence 
lives and acts. Moreover,we have no assurance that the world was evolved 
or came into being in accordance with this programme,a prograwne which 
is really identical with the great generalization which Herbert Spencer 
presented to the world in his famous definition of evolution,that is, 
' if we sub at i tute for' matter 1 these 'neutral ent it ies 1 • All the differences, 
all the marvellous complexities of the world are simply driven back 
into these 'neutral entities' as "into the night where all cows are black~ 
but where in the morning all the differences appear once more. For suppose 
we do say that everything in the world is a speci~ication of these funda-
mental neutral entities,and at the same time admit that they are different 
and that these differences must be accounted for,it is evident that what 
we have done is simply to shift the problem,and,furthermore,we have fallen 
prey to the notion that logical simplification is also a simplification 
of the onto~ogical facts,and we need again to be reminded that in our 
classifications we "abolish no differences,:and create no similarities". 
This is readily seen in any familiar instance of the use of the 1 universal~ 
The concept 1man 1 is,indeed,very useful for d~aling with what is evidently 
a distinct biological group,but to infer,therefore, that all the indivi-
duals subsumed under the general notion are in every respect alike would 
be a grievous .error .. Within this group other groups by the thousands may 
be formed for this reason that fundamentally,while all men no doubt have 
something in common,everr man is ~ifferent from every other man,and this 
fact needs explanation as well as-the observed similarities. 
But this error roots in a deeper one - in the notion of poten-
tiality. It is evidently not seen that the logical equivalence of cause 
I, . 30. 
and effect is very at ringent. Th'e cause must be such that provision is 
· nlade fOr the effect I fOr. if the effeCt iS not inClUded in the CaUSe the' 
effect is groundless and unaffirmable,that is, as far as particular con-
nection is concerned;and if it is included then we are deadlocked. And 
this is just where Nee-Realism finds itself. All the effects of this com-
plex world must be provided for in the'neutral entities 1 ,that is, we get 
all these complexities by including them as potential in the neutrals 
from the beginning,and then in order to account for the world process 
we get these same neutrals to 1 empty out 1 their contents. This in logic. 
Of course,the notion is held that in some way these neutrals contain 
not actually,but potentially the world-order,just as the premiss may 
·' 
containmore than the definitr conclusion which is sought. Just what this 
potentiality is and how it works is never explained, it is ·just assumed. 
'Being'is the fundamental term and from this everything follows by logical 
and ontological necessity,and these,as we saw,are one. The fact is,we 
have n~ explanation but just a shuffling of terms. As we go forward we 
actualize the potential and as we travel backward we potentialize the 
actual. If this is denied,then the other horn of the dilemma must be 
faced. If we trace effects to causes in such a programme as Neo-Realism 
offers we must trace them to such causes as contain them and then these 
causes themselves must be seen as effects of other causes, and so .on inde-
'• finitely. !ri other words, we are committed to an infinite regress. In the 
Neo-Realistic,or in any other system where necessity rules we are either 
deadlocked by the law of identity,which forbids us to say that anything 
is A which is not contained in the not ion of A, it is either this,or we 
are committed to the idea of an infinite regress,and in either case left 
destitute of explanation •. 
But the deepest error committed by the Nee-
Realist of Professor Holt's type is the acceptance of the notion originally 
defended by Professor James that one entity may be two or several things 
all at the .same time. This leads to the notion that the 1neutral entities' 
may be mind,matter,force,and all the concrete manifestations of these, 
as well as any other things which are,and still be just itself. 
c ~, ' • ~- - 1 '"' '' ., • • "' ~ -
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'. Here we have the old Spencerian and evolutionary notion that in the pro-
.cess of development the lower forms are transformed into the higher,but 
that in spite of the trans format ion the higher are really not any· different 
from the lower. They are all neutral entities,and the apparent differences 
are dismissed with the phrase "different groupings of the same anti ties." 
Here again the subtraction is made from the noun,but that which was sub-
tracted is again carefully added in the adjective and the plain fact is 
that we have been made the dupes of the ''natural imposture and deceit of 
words". Permanence and change are two contradictory notions,as the history 
of philosophy very clearly tells us,and they cannot be reconciled on any 
impersonal or mechanical plane. As a matter of fact the endeavor to find 
something truly permanent in the world of matter or in the world of neu-
tral entities fails,a fact well recognized by Professor Holt.when he says:-
"Therey.fs change or actiyity in the neutral realm,and this must also be 
involved in any object,such as consciousness,that is made up of the neutral 
entities."* But still a permanence of some kind must be found,and the point 
is that it cannot be found by postulating neutral entities which are 
supposed to remain the same while they do change. As idealism has always 
insisted,permanence can be found only in personality,- in a self which 
is conscious of itself while its states come and go. Of course,this per-
manence must not be conceived of in any materialistic fashion,as some 
m.fnd-stuff which abides while its states change,but ~ather under the notion 
that the soul has the power to relate its experiences to the one conscious-
ness,and that this consciousness affirms its sameness in memory and revea~s 
its identity in experience. This self-equality of intelligence in experien-
ce is the only real identity which we are able to find,and this identity 
of the ~biding self is an identity,moreover, ~hich is able to initiate 
change without being itself affected thereby, - for change in this case 
will be the successive phases under which an identical intelligence reali-
zes its abiding purposes. Here we have the root-thought of idealism,the 
only system of thought which is able to an answer to the puzzle which 
James sought to solve - how one thing can be in two places at the same 
time,or what is the deeper meaning of the puzzle,how change and identity 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p.218. 
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can be reconciled. And the answer which idealism gives removes the diffi-
. '~ 
< 
culty of'infinite regress' as well 1 for when an event has been referred 
to an agent in whome resides this power of initiation 1 the event is satis-
factorily explained 1 at least for all those beings who feel this power as . 
a part of their own conscious lives. 
, I 
33. 
Our third toP.iC is the conq~pt of consciousness as given bY. Professor Holt. 
Following the plan which has been maintained in the 
preceding sections I will endeavor to let Professor Holt state his con-
-
caption in his own words,reserving any criticisms that I may wish to offer 
until we clearly and sympathetically understand what this new concept ion 
really means. He says:- "It was said at the outset of this volume that 
our aim is a deductive account of consciousness. This means the framing 
of a set of terz:1s and propositions from which a system is deducible that 
contains such an entity,or class of entities, as we familiarly know under 
the name of a consciousness or mind. There can be no differences of sub-
stance between the original terms and the consciousness entit~ deduced, 
for the latter consists of the former in some sort of combination. • •••. ~~~~~~~_;~~~=-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--- ' 
••••• Of all the entities in the neutral series that are simpler or more 
fundamental than minds,it is clearly those that immediately precede it in 
point of simplicity that are the most important for us. These,as we have 
fo,J.nd in our survey of the neutral hierarchy, are physical objects - orga-
nic and inorganic entities,both living and dead. 1 Ah,now 1 ,some reader 
will certainly say,'this whole busi~ess is exposed for what it is- a 
disguised materialism •. ' But rio,I must reply, it is nothing worse than 
'mere materialism. Material objects,after all,are,and it is a sad evasion 
to deny or to misconstrue their being: but I believe that I have fully 
shown that their substance is the same as that of mathematical logical 
concepts,and that the substance of both is strictly neutral ••••••.••. 
•••••• It was partly in order to forestall the charge of 'Materialism' 
that the foregoing ontological considerations have been presented. 
After all,though we start' out with inorganic and organic material objects 
their compos it ion out of strictly neutral entities will not fail to 
appear from time to time in the discussion •••••••••••••• we have always 
known,of course,that plants 1 respond'in a general way to sunlight, air, 
and water, More recently we have become acquainted with processes that 
are more appropriately named 'responses'. Roots do not grow downward by 
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qhance 1 nor by any pre-established harmony,nor'yet by instinct,but they 
~ 
respond mechanically to the attraction of gravitation •••••••••••••••• 
Similarly 1 and by virtue of a diet inct mechanism the various part a· of a 
plant respond variously to light of different colours and intensities ••• 
• • • • • . • • • • • • Uow •••••••.• these several mechanisms of response,define a 
certain cross-section of the plant's environment •••••••••••• These forces 
to which the plant responds are those components of its environment that 
are of vital moment ••••• to it ••••••••• The leaflet bends toward a ray of 
lig~t (.~.'physical 1 energy,if you will),but it responds more rapidly to 
a more intense ray,and to a very weak ray will not respond at all. It 
therefore responds ,not merely to l·ight, but also to intensity. In respond-
ing differently to different grades of intensity, it defines grades of 
intensity,as well as light energy,as components of its effective environ-
mental cross-section. Now,whatever light may be,grades of intensity are 
not physical objects. It is self-evident that they are 'the fundamental 
neutral" substances. The response of the plant has so cross-cut its phy-
sical environment as to select from the physical objects certain of their 
obviously neutral constituents. These and these alone belong to the plant~ 
cross-section •••••••• In a similar way plants respond in all their 
tropisms very specifically to direction,as such •••••.•••• And if we 
were thus to study plant responses in detail,we should find that very 
few,indeed, of the factors to which the plant responds are such entities 
as would ordinarily be said to have physical existence:although both the 
plant and its environment are plain physical objects. The plant's cross-
section is as neutral a manifold as any purely mathematical system: yet 
this cross-section we have seen,is all there is by way of environment 
for the plant. It is therefore not a stretching of the facts but an in-
evitable concession to reason and to common sense to say that the plant 
lives and moves in a purely neutral realm ••••••••••••• This manner in 
which a cross-section is defined by response,! may say at once,is my 
definition of the knowing process. . •••••.•••••• The reader will .. already 
have reflected that in animal organisms the phenomena of response define 
------~--~-------,----------------------------~· 
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a similar,although in the higher organisms amore complicated,environ-
-
mental cross-section. In the lower forms of animal life the tropisms pre-
sent themselves as all iruportant,while in the higher forms and particu-
larly in vertebrates the tropisms give place more or leas completely to 
reflex movements. 
The mechanisms of response have been :further differen-
tiated and wonderfylly co-ord:inated and unified in a nervous system. Of 
this system the anatomical unit is undoubtedly the neuron,while the physi-
ological or functional unit· is the reflex-arc. • .••••••••••• We have seen 
•••••••••••. that the nervous system is a strictly physical system of 
neurones and reflex-arcs,in which no trace is found of an entity that 
could resemble the soul. Yet we know beyond any peradventure,and have 
known ever since the days of Democritus,that the human consciousness,mind, 
or soul, in some way or other depends on the human nervous- system. But it 
is not within the nervous system,as logic,epistemology,and physiology 
combined do plainly demonstrate •. The solution of this-difficulty must now 
be clear. We have seen that the phenomenon of response defines a cross-
section of the environment without,which is a neutral manifold. Now this 
neutral cross-section outside of the nervous system,and composed of the 
neutral elements of physical and non-physical objects to which the ner-
vous system is responding bz some specific response, - this neutral 
cross-section,! submit,coincides exactly with the list of objects of which 
we saz that we- are conscious. This neutral cross-section as defined b¥ 
the specific reaction of-reflex-arcs is the psychic realm: -it is the 
manifold of our aenaations,perceptions and ideas: - it is consciousness • 
•• .•••••••••••..• · ••.•• In closing I wish to point out that the manifold 
of mind,of idea, has been found by deduction. The knowing process has 
been reached deductively;we have found the psychic cross-eection,the 
conscious manifold,by a series of necessary deductive s~epa in a system 
wher~ neither knowing process nor 'conscious entity was postulated. The 
knowing process is one form of the response process. All being,once again, 
is fundamentally neither mind nor matter,but one neutral substance. 
Certain relatively simple combinations of the neutral entities are the 
£] ' a . 
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logico-mathematical terms and systems;certain more complicated aggregates 
are physical bodies in their spacial and temporal relations,while the 
yet more complicated aggregates defined by the response .. relation are the 
manifold that are kno•·m as mental. I ·fi th i ' •.•••••. n ne, e consc ousness 
that depends upon any given living organism is the sumtotal of all neutral 
entities to which that living organism responds."'* 
After this long quotation we may sum up its content as 
to the nature of consciousness in the following statement: - A mind or 
a consciousness is a cert~in objective grouping of neutral elements, 
~athered out of the total universe,the principle of grouping or selection 
being some specific response of some definite nervous system. Any el~ment · 
of reality may become mental or enter into the content of mind whenever 
a nervous sxstec reacts to it. How much,then,io mind in the universe? 
The answer _!~ 1.t_hat portion to which a certain set of nervous systt3ms re-
. spond. It is clear that on this theory a mind is simply a t ernporary field, 
selected from many possible such fields by the response of a nervous 
system. There are three points in this connection which need to be dwelt 
upon in order,to understand this conception of consciousness. First,it 
must be seen that mind or consciousness is not to be thought of as any-
thing subjective, - as anything within us or as anything which is a part 
of the nervous organism,or the body. It is,instead,an objective field or 
cross-section of reality. Professor Holt is very definite on this point. 
He says:-"Now we have seen that on the purely epistemological side •.•.•• 
•••••. consciousness or mind is not inside of the skull nor secreted any-
where within the nervous system;but that all the objects which one per-
' 
ceives,including the-so-called 'secondary qualities'are 'out there' just 
where and as they seem to· be."** Second,there is no mental activity as 
such,for mind or consciousness is not thought of as an agent in which 
any such activity inheres,but rat-her as a resultant of certain neutral 
activities,that is, in the stimulation and the response of a nervous 
system. Professor Perry is somewhat more explicit on this point than· is 
Professor Holt,and,therefor,I wish to quote him in this connection. His 
discussion centers around "the time-honored theory that the action of. 
* Concept of Consciousness 1 pp.l66-l84~*Ibid,p.l81. 
37. 
of mind is revealed to the agent himself in an· immediate intuition.'Such 
is the nature of spirit or that which acts'says Berkeley,'that it cannot 
be of it self pe:.cceived •••.•• though it must be owned at the same ·time 
that we have some notion of aoul,spirit,and the operations of the mind'. 
Berkeley's view met its classic refutation inHume. He showed that the 
most exhaustive introspective analysis reveals no such 'creative power' 
but only a manifold and a nexus of contents. Taken 'psychologically' 
says Mr. Bradley,'the revelation is fradulent. There is no original ex-
per~ence of anything. like activity. 1 The supposition that there is such 
a revelation is possible only provided one refuses to analyze certain 
experience into its elements. When the so-called experience of mental 
activity is so analyzed no activity element is found ••••••••••• Now it 
is my lot to be a self-conscious mind. I .have practised self-consciousneoo 
habitually,and it is certain that no one is so familiar with myself as 
I. But I have little to show for it all: the articulatory image 6f my 
name,tne visual image of my social prescence,and a few poor phrases •••• 
••••• I am confident that the nature of mental action is discoverable 
neither by an analysis of mental contents,nor.by self-intuition;that it 
is necessary,in short,to abandon the method of self-knowledge altogether, 
and substitute that of general observation."* With this position Professor 
Holt is in perfect agreement as may be seen. by a perusal of his chapter 
on "Empirical Properties of Consciousness",and hence the criticism which 
may be offered on Professor Perry's account fits for him as well; and"since 
Berkeley's v~ew met its classic refutation in Huce",and since Professor 
Perry has followed Hume' s lead and has''practised self-consciousness 
hab:!.tually" and has found no trace of either"activity" or of "self", I 
can do no better than to review a famous criticism of that same argument, 
in which it, in its turn, met its"classic refutation." The passage refer-
red to by Professor Perry is in part as follows: -''For my part when I 
enter most intimately into what I call myself,! always stumble on some 
particular perception or other,of heat or cold,light or shade, love or 
hatred,pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without 
a perception,and can never observe anything but the perception ..••••• 
* Present Philosophical Tendencies,pp.280-283. 
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If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,thinks that he has 
<'• 
a different idea of hin1self, I must confess that I can reason no longer 
with him. All I can allow is that he may be in the right as well ·as I, 
and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps 
perceive something simple and continued which he calls himself;though 
I am certain there is no such principle in me."* Commenting on this 
passage Professor Bowne,in a discussion concerning the self as a unitary, 
active principle without which the judgment and hence truth would be 
impossible proceeds as follows: - "We shall get a realizing sense of the 
advantage of expressing a theory in language which hides its real nature 
I 
if we will be at the pains to substitute for the personal pronouns in 
this passage the vanishing impressions required by the theory. As none 
of these abides beyond the instant of its occurrence,and all are perpetual 
ly dissolving into something else,it follows that the first I is not 
the same as the second I,and that of the later I's no one has any identity 
with arty other. The Hume of the beginning of the passage dissolves into 
any number of other Humes before it ends. But the humrous nonsense.of 
the doctrine is concealed from the reader by the language employed,which 
throughout implies the denial of the theory. Indeed, the view cannot be 
set forth in any form of human speech without hopeless contradiction. If 
Hume had been compelled to use the language of his own theory it would 
have needed no other criticism. When with such a conception of mind he 
can write, 1The mind has the command over all its ideas,and can separate, 
unite,mix,and vary them as it pleasest .one can hardly resist the impres-
sion that Hume is trying to see how far the game of logical hide-and-seek 
can be carried with human dulness."** The reason for using this "classic 
refutation" is that there exists a perfect correspondence between the 
views of Hume and those of Nco-Realism on the subject in question; for, 
in the first placeJsince mind,according to the Neo-Realists,is a partial 
' 
selection out of a total objective and neutral manifold and since this 
manifold is under the law of change just as were Hume 1 s ~npressions,it 
follows that nothing coherent can be said about theru,and since we have 
seen that "the pulses of experience" have no power to communicate their 
*Quoted by Professor Bowne in Theory of Thought and Knowledge,p,29. 
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state to the next following,it must be concluded that Neo-Realism~e~eating 
Hnnc'o error and i?_hat Berkeley is ve;_y far from being refuted!. Furthermore, 
Professors Holt and ~e.rry are COnf!ta:rltly .smuggli~~ in the'self' and~~ 
clarin[..!_~at we may j_-qd~~~~!l.!~~~'- 1 sele9_~Lall of which pr~~2.~<?_.~es t~ 
mental activitt_~~'-~~~:rL~se of .the.~£_writ.!~££~-~ay 'ce aU.duced 
as witness of this fact. 
We have no arrived at the place where these new and 
strange conceptions must be tested as to their ability to explain in a 
satisfactory manner such problems as 1perception 1 , 1memory 1 1 1 knowledge 1 , 
~~d others. The remainder of Professor Holt's book is given ove~ to this 
endeavor. We shall follow each discussion in the order in which he pre-
sents it and at the close of each paragraph offer such criticisms as are 
pertinent. The first problem is that of "Sensation and Perception in the 
Conscious Cross-sect ion •. " Professor Holt proceeds as follows: - "In re-
gard t 9 the entry ,manence, and exit of sensations .and percept ions there 
is no difficulty~ The conscious cross-section is-a manifold that moves 
in time and space as would the contents of a township if ita boundaries 
were defined anew from moment to moment ••••••••••••. Changes certainly 
go on in the neutral realm of being,and there are countless collections 
which preserve their collective identity while their contents fluctuate. 
Such a collective identity is consciousness •. In sensation the neutral 
qualities,.the so-called 'secondary qualities' come and go as more or less 
unrelated elements;while in perception they enter and depart in groups 
- omaller or larger •.••.•••••• I have already pointed out that conscious-
ness is extended in both space and time: - in space as spacial objects 
are extended,consciousnes~oeing actually such parts of the objects as are 
perceived,i.e.suoh parts'as are consciousness: and in time as a quu.rter-
hour,a day,or a week is extended. The measure of its extension is an 
empirical matter. Consciousness also,of course,changes in time and moves 
about in space .•.•..• , ••••••••••• There is change or activity in the neu-
tral realm,and this also must be involved in any object such as conscious~ 
ness that is made up of neutral entities •••••••••••••••••• We have now 
40 • 
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seen how our definition of consciousness accounts for sensation and 
perception · 
• • · · · · • · • · · • · • • • · • · .• The remaining matter to be consiuered is 
that of 'true correspondence between sensations and perceptions and their 
, • I . , 
OOJects. ············And it ~ust be obvious that under the definition 
of consciousness sensations and perceptions do not involve correspondence 
at all,true or untrue, •••••..••••••• In fact,there are not sensations or 
percept ions and their object a. There are objects _,Jl!ld wh~Il_ these are in-
cluded in the manifold called consciousness they are called sensations 
---------·-------·-·-- -·----·--------· ·--·---- ..... ---------
~~d Ee~c~~~!~ ••••••.•••••.•••• sensations and perc~£tion~.~~-the __ 
objects."* 
It will not be necessary 1to sum up' the conceptions stated in 
the last quotation,they are,indeed, "plain and outapoken",and I proceed 
at once to offer rny _object ions to them. In the first place a thoughtful 
reflection_ upon the notion "that consciousness changes in time and moves 
about in space" ,and that it is actually extended in both space and time, 
. 
that"the sensation of red is a red sensation,and the perception of the 
landscape is as big as the landscape and that the exact idea of an hour's 
time would be just an hour long,and of ten years would be just ten years", 
a thoughtful reflection upon these positions,! say, vrould lead one to 
conclude that consciousness as it is experienced among men is plainly an 
impossibility. ,To say,for instance, that my .perception'of the sun must 
be as extended of the sun and of the same shape as the sun,that is, 
globular,is plainly saying the impossible,for the sun as revealed in my 
perception is very different in its extension from· its real extension, 
and the same holds true for all spacial objects. With regard to the per-
ception of its globularity,the real perception of a globe is likewise 
iznpoasible,for even if some angel should come and escort one all around 
it,the perception would be of successive extended surfaces,but never of 
the globe as a whole. Again,if the idea of ten years must, in order to 
' 
be adequate, be ten years long then it is evident that all judgments 
of a temporal nature are inadequate,and to make them adequate would make 
thinking impossible,for if I must wait ten years in order to adequately 
. * The Concept of Consciousnes,pp.209-222. 
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understani that period, then I must wait ten years more before I adequately 
understand that ten years plus ten-years make twenty years • If we seek 
to escape this horn of the dilemma we must admit some sort of representa-
tive function in thought, that -is, we must admit that sensations and per-
ceptions are essentially different from things. Professor Holt does not 
admit thi,out his way of working implies it, for if his theory were followed 
sincerly his acco~~t of consciousness would have to be as extended as is 
consciousness,and we must remember that "Consciousness is extended as 
spatial objects are extended", that·it "changes in time and moves about 
in space~ and yet his whole account is contained in a volume that has 
very little of extension in space and has certainly no shape or likeness 
to the objects it describes. So we must fall back after all on some kind 
of representative theory. The question that confronts us is, How is per-
ception possible? Before we advance on that discussion,however, I would 
like to ask a question which seems pertinent here. According to Professor 
Holt,c6nsciousnesa is just where the perceived object is; it is not in the 
skull nor in the body,it is "out there" where the thing is;and since 
"response" is a measurable quantity,that is, some form of motion,and 
since consciousness exists in time, Ho;·; long does it take for conscious-
ness to find itself in the sun? Or if the speed of"response" is so in-
creditbly swift that here it would take only a few seconds,How long would 
it take for consciousness to find itself,say in a star which is so far 
distant that it takes the light travelling at the rate of 180,000 miles 
per second three thousand years to reach usr And since we are so deluded 
as to believe that we perceive many stars in .one act of perception,and 
since we know that these have immeasurable depths of space between them 
what is the measure of time required for the transition? These are legi-
timate questions. But to return to our discussion;as we contemplate this 
notion of perception and remember that change is constant,not only in the 
neutral realm but in the realm of-matter,and since consciousness is a 
perpetually changing cross-section of changing entities,or identically 
the saoe to which Hume reduced consciousness - passing and ch~~ging im-
pressions - how are we to obtain that permanence which recognizes chan~e 
. .I H -~ -~ ---~ . . . - , ' 
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and as over against which it may be measured and understood? For it is 
plain that if everything flowed the flow would not be noticeable. So,then, 
in order to provide for change some sort of permanence is needed.· Professor 
Holt seeks to answer this quest ion by saying that since one thing can be 
in two places at the same time ( the fallacy inherited from James and 
central to all Nee-Realistic positions) and since things may be identical 
and yet different at the same time (pp.234-238) the "knowledge mass may 
intersect the temporal flow in such a manner "that while the knowledge-
masses of time are discontinuous,fragmentary,somewhat fortuitously 
distributed intersect ions of the time system:- discontinuous and fragmen-
tary, that is, as compared with the latter (time) system, n this fact "does 
not prevent the cross-sect ions, identical us they with some feat urea of 
the events,having in the knowledge system the identical relations of 
'before' and 'after' that the events themselves have in the (past) time."* 
This,being interpreted,means that since events occur under the form of 
time,tliat is,with a 'before 1 and 'after' to them,that is,in succession, 
and since the knowledge-mass for certain stretches,at least,runs parallel 
or rather,is identical with these events,the rela~ionship of time is in 
consciousness as a matter of course,and this gives us the knowledge of 
past events. This explanation,however, meets immediately with the fatal 
criticism that "succession in experience "is very far from being an "experi-
' ~ ~ 
ence of successionn. It is all the difference between con6ciousneas and 
self-conaciousness,the forruer might be possible with succession in experi-
once,but the latter would be made impossible ,for if no memory existed 
the notion of a past could never arise. Indeed,nothing but a flow results 
until we are able to find some kind of permanence,and evidently seeing 
the need of this as imperative Professor Holt finally provides for it 
by smuggling in the phrase 11 the recalling consciousness",as well ~s other 
phrases with the same meaning and intent. (p .234.) This must ultimately 
mean that the power of memory inheres as an endowment of the neutral enti-
ties. But the point is that even so we are not materially helped,for 
since consciousness exists in space and time its unity is doubly impossible 
* The Concept of Consciousness,p.244. 
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"its phases are mutually external and its experiences exclusive or successive 
and we are right back in the flow and all ita waves and itsfoillows are 
going over us. And there is no way of escape by Nee-Realism and its 
neutral entities,for they are all submerged in it. There is nothing to 
do but to deal truthfully and honestly with experience and recognize that 
there exists a "conscious self" in connection with each human organism, 
and that this self reveals its permanence by the way in which it is able 
to deal with e.xpor ience. It canst it ut es it self as identical by revealing 
its power to carry the past with it into the present and by the power to 
differentiate itself,not only from the external world,but even from its 
. ' 
own states. As we saw some pages back we are driven to see that some sort 
of representative notion is involved in consciousness,that the idea that 
thought and thing are identical leads to such impossible conceptions as 
that,for instance, the thought of a mile is a mile long,et cetera. Let 
us now return to the problem of perception and ask once again,How is per-
ception possible? How can we have objects in our minds?-And the answer 
must be that in a litteral or Ueo-Roalistic sense objects can never be 
in the mind. The mind can only think and the thing can only be and act 
according to its nature. All figures of speech which seek to describe 
the process as a "shedding of minute images",or as the mind "flowing 
around the object",or "melting with the object" miss its real meaning 
and nature. Perception is possible only on the supposition that the mind 
is organic and that j.t has within itself the potll/'er so to respond to the 
stimulation of the external world as to construct out of itself the vision 
and the worth of that world. And it ought to be remembered that the world 
as it is for mind - the world of light and color and sound is admittedly 
very different from the ~aterial world of different intensities and 
kinds of vibrations of energy. This,indeed,is a dualism,a dualism which 
is ineradic.able as far as e.xper ience is concerned, but it is also a dual ism 
which may be transcended in thought in that absolute experience that is · 
not merely a system of thoughts,but also a system of some kind of spiritual 
·-
energy according to thought. 
The second important point in this connection is the 
Ueo-Realist ic theory of knowledge. As we saw at the beginning of this 
essay the one outstanding element in Neo-Realism is its endeavor to mag..:. 
nify logic at the expense of epistemology,or,in other words, the Nee-
Realists traduce 1knowledge' bec~use on their theory there can be no question 
as to .the validity of our thought for the external world,for where"per-
ceptions and sensations" are the objects" there is no room for,as some-
thing subjective and mental,the notion of error. Professor Perry discusses 
this problem somewhat more at length than does Professor Holt,although 
both are in agreement as to the fundamental posit ion, therefore I shall 
quote some passages from the former ao well as from the latter. We saw 
in a former quotation from Professor Holt that "the manner in which a 
cross-section is defined by response ••••••• is my definition of the know-
ing process." Professor Perry puts this in a striking phrase when he says 
that "lt would not,! think, be far from the truth to .aay,that the cardinal 
princi~le of neo-realism is the independence of the immanent",which means 
"that things may be,and are, directly experienced without owing either 
their being or their nature to that circumstance .. "· And again,"The most 
general argument for realism is an application of the theory of the ex-
ternal or extrinsic character of relations. According to the contrary 
view,relations penetrate,posses,and compromise their terms,so that it is 
impossible to separate the terms from the rel~tiona without destroying 
them. But according to the theory of the externality of relations,terms 
acquire from their relation an added character,which does not either con-
dition, nor neceasar ily alter, the character which they already possess."'* 
This conception is now applied to the relation of things to consciousness 
and. the inference is drawn that a thing in becoming 1 immanent 1 , that is, 
in coming into conaciousness,does thereby receive an 1added character', 
' 
which,nevertheless,doespot alter ita independent character. I do not wish 
at this point to review ground already covered,I only wish to point out 
that when you add something to a certain quantity you thereby change its 
* Present Philosophical Tendencies,pp.311-315. 
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ita nature. If you add one to nine you have ten and you can divide ten 
by t\vo and get a whole number as a result,which is impossible if you: 
seek to divide nine by two. The fact is that if our logical notions are 
are not allowed to have any abiding significance,reason commits suicide, 
and that is where Neo-Realism leads us,in its.assertion that one and two 
are identical. This shuffle is illustrated again and again in the writings 
of James and Perry and Holt,but two instances must suffice. Says Professor 
Perry,after having argued'for the independence of the 1reals 1 , "It is im-
possible to argue that 'independent reals' must stand absolutely out of 
relations to consciousness,if they are to be independent."' On this basis, 
what is independence to mean? Dependence in one case,when it suits the 
convenience of the writer and then independence when some other occasion 
demands a different conception? On that basis,any communion or communi-
cation of thought bec.omes impossible,and,strange to declare,Neo-Realism 
ends in solipsism. In like manner Professor Holt when he says:-"By 
virtu~ of the fact that the knowledge system,defined by the responses of 
a nervous system transects the system known at various and sundry places, 
it results that the two systems are partially identical •. " Passing by 
the misleading terminology of 'partial identity 1 ,may I ask this question: 
"How,following Professor Holt's reasoning,can '"e know that these systems 
are not identical? Where is that knowledge to be acquired? In the first 
place, the distinction of mind or consciousness as a ~rtai~~o~~ or 
e~~~tx selected bl means of the nervous response of some definite nerv~~~ 
sys~em from out of the total objective universe,this distinction,! say, 
is impossib!e· For in order tha~ the Neo-Realis~_should distin~uish his 
own mind from the rest of the univer~e,the whole uni!erse must become a 
~art of his mind. The universe as a whole is a presupposition of selec-
. ·------
t ive thinki~,for __!n o~der to ~erceive a part as such the whol~t or at. 
least somethin& greater than the ~~tti~_presuEposed. Thus the Nee-Realistic 
theory of mind is impossibl~t~~ the &er1:eral Nee-Realistic theory is true. 
Returning to Professor Perry's account of consciousness I wish quote as 
follows:-"Conaciousness is a selective response to a preexisting and 
independently existing environment ••••••••••• The spacial and temporal 
. ' I 
! 
46. 
. -distribution of bodies in its field of action,and the more abstract logical 
and mathematicai relationships which this field contains,determine the 
possible objects of consciousness. The actual objects of consciousness 
~e selected fro~ ,.this manifold of possibilities in obedience to the various 
exigencies of life."* Now suppose that we grant that in a certain way this 
describes with a measure of correctness our responses to the objective 
·environment including even "logical and mathematical entities" (although, 
of course, this cannot be granted in truth), and that the group of entities 
constituting mind are selected by the reactions of the nervous system, 
two questions arise. In the first place,the phrase "the selective response" 
reminds one very much of mind as it is conceived of by the idealists,~ 
that is,as an entity that has the power to 'compare', 'discriminate' and 
'judge'. It would seem that an important quality of mind as the idealists 
understand mind is being surreptitiously brought into the discussion. For 
let us see what we really have on the Nee-Realistic plane. Certain mani-
folds-of neutral entities in the greater manifold called matter are of 
such nature that when certain other neutral entities in the same great 
manifold, - the neutral entities which compose the nervous system of the 
individual human being - exibit a characteristic action or reaction in 
answer to the action of the other manifolds,an illumination of some kind 
occurs and this illumination is consciousness. There is no thought as such 
'· 
the selective response of the nervous system is the cause of the illumi-
nation;but thought has no special function to fulfil within the illuminated 
cross-section where neither perceptions or sensations are but only things. 
In such a system there is no place for thought as an activity,different 
fro~ the activity of the neutral entities,and since these are expressly 
declared not to be mental,thought is certainly eliminated entirely. But 
if neither'thought 1nor 1permanence 1 exists it is hard to see how the judgment 
which is implied in 'selection' is possible. It is plainly im~ossible and 
' 
we are reduced to the lowest tyEe of some kind of Ereeatablished harmony 
-the har~~ny of an oEaque necess~tarianism of which nothin~_can be said. 
And,finally,and from another point of view, we know 
* Present Philosophic Tendencies,p.323. 
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that we often react to the nervous system itself. Now when the nervous 
system itself becomes an object and thus enters into the group mind 1 then 
the nervous system reacts up.on itself,selects itself. In the previous 
discussion we have had"all the slings and arrows of an outrageous"Neo-
Realistic criticism directed at the follies of introspection - of trying 
to find the mind in experience -and the criticism based upon the impos-
sibility of a subjective experience of the self,and now we come to an 
impersonal entity. that reacts upon itself (this in logic) 1 selects it self 1 
and,as a matter of fact 2devotes 12a6es of printed ~a~ter:,_!o demonstrate 
the imE,o~sibility of it being done •. Neo-Realism,like Pragmatism,gets 
along pretty well until it strikes the problem o£ thought and then it 
finds that it has no facilities for handling that matter. It is a well-
known fact that Professor James was never able to deal in any satisfac-
tory manner with the objects which had no reference to a perceptual mode 
of experience. And so we are forced to the conclusion 1 after a11 1 that 
the the?!X of knowledg~ is t~e touch-atone for P.hilosophic sy~tems 1 and 
that no theory which makes knowledge a secondary consideration can survive. 
But,of course, for a system that can make 1one 1 identical with 1two 1 "all 
things are possible." 
II 
"* ts •. 
In the fourth F~ce we are to coEsider"t~e problem of error." 
Since Professor Holt begins his discussion of this 
subject wi·th a review of the reasons why he can~ot accept Professor Perry t s 
account of error, and since these thinkers are everywhere else in constant 
agreement,and since in our previous discussions we have had occasion to 
consider Professor Perry's views,it may be well to seek to understand how 
they differ in this respect. Professor Perry states his view,clearly, as 
follows: -"We have found that the selective act ion of consciousness not 
only invests things w~th the character of 'object' or 1content 1 j but at 
the same time according as it excludes or includes,also defines character-
istic fragments,foreshortenings,and assembl~ges of things,that may not 
coincide with physical and logical linea of cleavage. And these may be 
said to be subjective ••••••••••••••••••• Subjective manifolds, or fictions, 
once instituted by the action of consciousness,may become stereotyped. 
They may be remembered or described,and through_ tradition and art,they 
may be incorporated more or less permanently into the environment. such 
being the case they may be mistaken for what they are not,and thus give 
rise to illusion and error •••••••••••••• there is no error until fiction 
is mistaken for fact;~d there is no truth in tho correlative sense until 
a conten~"- of mind is rightly taken to be fact."* It is not to be wondered 
at that professor Holt is not ready to accept this accotmt or any similar 
such, for if taken ''str:J.ctl)r for what it says" ,and still more for what it 
iinplies,it repudiates the whole !{eo-Realistic position as far as mind or 
consciousness is concerned. Let us consider its relation to Professor 
Perry's previous posit ions. We have already dealt with "selection" as 
not consistent with his· system, but nolv we find that mind which is a neutral 
cross-section not only "invests things with the character of 1 object 1 or 
1 content 1 , but it also"definoa cparacter iat ic fragments, fore shortenings, •••• 
. •• • •• •• of things" and these are subjective. The mind also ''abstracts 
; 
from the plenum of nature" such things as 'perspective' and 'point of vievl'. 
* Present Philosophical Tendencies,pp.323 -325~ 
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' Indeed, the mind that we are no;, dealing with has all the powers of mind, 
as the idealists understand that entity,and we are back to. an epistemo-
logical dualism, "for there is no truth in the correlative sense· until a 
content of mind is rightly taken to be a fact." As far as error is concerned 
it is due to the mental or subjective habit of "abstracting from the plenum 
of nature". Verily Hume is still with us. The organic nature of mind which 
he was forced to reco~nize in a left-handed sort of a way when he admitted 
that whatever ideas existed and were not conies of impressions were due ·- ' -~ __ .:;..;...._;_;.:.~_,;..;-...;_  _..:.._..;. ________ _ 
to the "mind's propensity tofeign" this finds a repetition in the_se"s_ubjec-
tive fictions" of Professor Perry's. At any rate,it must be evi_E.~nt that 
these observat}ons,however true they mieht b~have no_place in a system 
where the subjective manifold is all one wit.h the objective and where 
nothing is altered by coming into consciousness~. 
In this particular, Professor Holt follows his logic to 
the bitter end,and presents us with a conception of error both new and 
unique. He says, in part: -"Now it folloivs from our definition of conscious-
\ ness that opinions,whether right or wrong,pertain to the same neutral 
realm as material objects,and that a human mind is one kind of neutral 
aggregate ( a cross-section) just as a material object is another kind. 
Nor does there appear any reason,when these two realms are thus monistically 
viewed, V7hereby error should occur exclusively among the neutral aggregates 
._!: 
that are minds. Errors are,as we have just seen, a feature of the neutral 
realm at large,logically prior to the division into aubject~d objects, 
and are,presumably,therefore to be found both in the so-called subjective 
and·the objective phenomena alike." He readily admits that errors are 
found in the •subjective phenomena' and that they consist in 'contradictory 
propositions' and then he continues as follows: "but it remains to be 
seen whether the objective is thoroughly conaistent,as is so universally 
alleged;whether it does not contain,precisely like the'subjective•contra-
' dictory propositions. My thesis is that the physical or so-called 'outer' 
or 1 real' world is thro!Jeh and thr.o~h contr~dictorY..:.. ••••••••••• Thus': 
all phenomena of interference are cases of contradictions between proposi-
tions. At the point of interference the vibratory motions imparted to 
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the ether or to molecules are contradictory to one another,and at that 
point the wave-motion ceases and energy is said to have assumed the form 
of tension. All counter-balancings,as in cantilevers and Gothic vaultings, 
are contradictory forces in equilibrium. All collisions between bodies, 
. all interference between energies,all processes of warming and cooling, 
of electrically charging and discharging,of starting and stopping,of 
combining and separat ing,are processes of which one undoes the other .And .. ~ 
they cannot be defined by the scientist except in propositions which 
manifestly contradict one another. All nature is so full of these mutually 
negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces co-
operate long enough ~o form what we call an organism; and even then decay 
sets in forthwith. We call nature ever}~here consistent,and yet we admit 
that life is a mystery while death is none: it is none because the antagon-
ism of contradictory forces is the familiar phenomenon,while co-operation 
of forces is relatively infrequent. Those theologians who once admired 
the wondrous works of God were discomfite~ver and anon when an irepartial 
observer called attention to the incidents less admirable. This doctrine 
of beneficence has given place to an equally fatuous one of the smooth 
consistency of natural processes. Nature is a seething chaos of contra-
diction ••••••••.••.••••••••• Now the problem of error in knowledge is 
virtually solved,! believe,by this view of the meaning and the being of 
1.'" 
error itself. Not a great deal·more remains to be said. The errors of 
1 op.inion' that were so early recognized, are, of course, always contra-
dictory propositions -the opinion that 'A is B' opposed by the opinion 
that 'A is not B'. The errors of knowledge are,then,the presence in the 
( 
knowledge-system of propositions that contradict each other: and such a 
situation calls for no. special explanation, because it is found in most 
manifolds that contain propositions."* As already stated Professor Holt 
places before us with admirable lucidity the logical outcome 1 as far as 
' 
error is concerned) of the whole philosophy of Neo-Real-ism. It ends 
where in logic it must end- in an absolute determinism. But,furthercore, 
curious to,relate, the outcome is at variance with some of the most funda-
mental assumptions of the system. 
* The Concept of Consciousness,pp.270-276. 
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In the first place,the notion that "nature is a seething chaos of 
contradict ion" is at variance with the fundamental asaumpt ion of the loe;icul 
·.necessity of order and development as. actual in the universe. Two quota-
tions from an earlier section of his work apeak for themselves on this 
point. In the chapter on The Neutral Mosaic he said:-"In coming.now to 
survey the realm of the neutral entities,the neutral mosaic, we recall. 
that these entitiea,just as in any logical system,are graded in a strict 
and in alienable order of complexities."· ( p.l54.) And again, "Thus we 
' I 
vaguely make out,not merely that all being,even in its forms so diverse 
as mind and matter,consists,indeed, of one neutral substance ••••••• but 
also that these neutral entities are marvellously compacted in a united 
system such that the simple devel_~p without break pr discontinuity into 
the m,gre and more complex,even down to tho infinite diversity of conc,Eete 
being •••••••••••• The successive closing in of the apparent gaps of the 
simp~~-to -complex aeries of beings brings it more and more within the 
limits of. probability that we shall one day learn that being is a single, 
i 
infinite,deductive system in which the entire variety develops deductively 
from a relatively · very small number of fundamental propos it ions •• · ••• 
• • • as we saw before ,j;hat thinkj.ng of_ OJ.lr§ whJch we call dedus:t ive 1 ou;r 
coherent thinking,doe~ but follow after the intrinsic activity of the 
neutral entities." ( p.l64.) 
Now it is evid~nt that in a strictly logical,deductive 
and ordered system there cannot be a "seething mass of contradict ions." 
In the second place,the universe as thus conceived is 
at variance with the assumption of knowledge. Professor Holt professes 
to be able to give us the "logical backbone"of the universe,that is 1he 
presupposes that he will be able to present valid reasons why his concep-
tion should be accepted by the truth-seeking individual. Now if nature 
is a" seething chaos of cant radict ion", and if "that thinking of ours which 
we call deductive,our coherent thinkin£ 1 does but follow after the intrinsi~ 
activity of the neutral entitiea",what guarantee have we that Professor 
Holt's thinking is not "a seething chaos of contradiction." 
52. 
In the third place, this conception of nature is at variance with 
the facts of experience. It is simply not true to declare that .natural 
forces 'contradict' each other,that word is carried over from the unpictur-
able operations of the mind and applied to material objects and thus the 
idea for which the word stands is carried over as well. What is really 
true is that material forces oppose each other,but that is a very different 
matter,for while contradiction implies that error is not,in the sense of 
being an objective fact,in other words,that error has no real existence; 
the verb "to oppose"implies that the oppositions are actual and real,and 
the fact that two forces oppose each other and cause "equilibrium" ,so far 
from being a"contradiction" ,may, indeed, express the· very"ordered: nature 
of the system". Indeed,it probably does,since the objective fact is thatfn 
all the manifestations of energy which we call things energies are so 
balanced. that for a certain time,at any rate,a permanence .is secured. 
But,of course,for Professor Holt,since he is forced to admit that error 
e:.<ists,and since for him the subjective activity of mind does not exist, 
error must needs be made objective,and since there is no possible crite-
rion,truth cannot be differentiated from error and so truth itself becomes 
imposs.ibleJand we are forced,once more,to see that"any theor;y which makes 
error necessary and cosmic destroys itself." 
53. 
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